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General Jurisprudence, Empirical Legal Theory, Epistemic Fruit, and the Ontology
of ‘Law’: Scope, Scepticism, Demarcation, Artefacts, Hermeneutic Concepts,
Normativity and Natural Kinds
John McKay – Osgoode Hall Law School
1. Introduction
There are, no doubt, many reasons one might want to theorize about law in a
philosophical mode. One ongoing reason is to address the key question(s) of general
jurisprudence, viz., what is law, or what is its nature, essence, defining attributes, or
necessary elements. There are some fairly well rehearsed arguments about how we
should understand these questions, and a not insignificant amount of argument between
advocates of different approaches. Despite the fact that different accounts of law are
frequently pursuing different theoretical goals, and offer different descriptions of reality
that are, in many ways, compatible with one another, there is, nonetheless, a great deal of
argument about which account is “correct.”
Different accounts generally fall into one of three camps: legal positivism, natural law
and social scientific or empirical legal theory (ELT).1 Despite the existence of some
variability between particular versions within each of these accounts, there is significant
agreement within each group as to what the nature of the object in question is, how it is to
be known, and what modes of investigation are likely to produce knowledge of it.
Members of all the camps are primarily interested in a real world phenomenon or set of
phenomena.2 I take this to be uncontroversial. We might take various approaches to
trying to understand real world phenomena, depending on what they are and what we
want to know about them. The members of the three different camps of legal theorists
have distinctly different views about the nature of the object in question, what is
knowable about it, what is worth trying to know, and the purposes of engaging in the
theoretical project.
Insofar as these different theoretical accounts of law focus on different objects there is
significant compatibility amongst them. There is, however, a significant dispute between
ELT and positivists about the project of a descriptive account of law, though dealing with
1

I am borrowing the phrase “empirical legal theory” from Roger Cotterrell, Politics of Jurisprudence, (U
of Pennsylvania Press 1989) 235, and believe I am using it much as he does, and in a way that means much
the same as social scientific legal theory, as invoked by others, notably Tamanaha, below. Empirical or
social scientific legal theory refers to a family of theoretical accounts (much as legal positivism and natural
law are also families) that includes legal anthropology, legal sociology, legal pluralism, and much of
American legal realism. The name “legal pluralism” emphasizes one aspect of a serious empirical theory,
namely, that the dogma of the unity of law, held by positivists (at least implicitly), is dismissed; while law
always claims unity and pre-eminence as a normative force within its jurisdiction, normative force is also
invariably a matter of contention. Now, obviously much work that would be thought of as falling into one
of these versions of ELT might not be very “theoretical.” Nonetheless, there is theoretical ELT work from
each version, and, I will argue, the theoretical work from different versions of ELT share a set of epistemic
and ontological commitments.
2
Trying to understand the nature of such phenomena might involve moments of pure abstract thought, such
as considering the nature of law for a society of saints or angels.

2
this dispute does not necessarily mean that one or the other account must be generally
wrong. However, I will argue that when it comes to the questions of general
jurisprudence ELT does the best job of addressing its questions if we focus on normal,
generally used epistemic standards. The work done by both natural law and positivist
accounts of law should be seen as more limited in their scope and specialized in purpose.
2. Positivists v. Natural Lawyers …
For a long time philosophical arguments in general jurisprudence have been dominated
by arguments between advocates of some version of natural law and advocates of some
version of legal positivism. As the arguments currently stand the differences between
these two camps often seem like ones of emphasis, and of the lexical right to claim the
word “law” for one’s own camp. The natural lawyers emphasize the normative structure
of law and see (non-defective) law as satisfying some reasonably acceptable political
morality. Positivists place the emphasis on law as a particular structural element of a
sufficiently well constituted political system; the existence of any particular law depends
on it having the right political source. Natural lawyers fully accept that there is an
important real world phenomenon commonly referred to as positive law (which
frequently includes defective laws, though ideally it would not). Positivists fully accept
that for positive law to have a moral claim on our obedience (for political obligation to
obtain), that law must fit in with, and satisfy, a reasonably constituted political morality
(though it is still law, even if it doesn’t do so). A centrally important ongoing driver of
the debate between natural lawyers and positivists is the claim to offer a better position
from which to criticize law that fails to satisfy a reasonable political morality. Natural
lawyers assert that because their conception of law entails an inherent moral evaluation of
law that their position is superior. For natural lawyers defective positive law does not
quite merit the name law.3 Positivists assert that because their position holds that the
existence of law is a contingent fact of political institutions, and is morally neutral or
inert, that it leaves infinite space for the moral critique of any actually existing laws or
political institutions. Positivists frequently find themselves the object of what they see as
unjustified criticism; their critics portray the positivist position as being that we are
3

This is often thought to be the essence of natural law and summed up by the Latin phrase lex iniusta non
est lex, or unjust law is not law. Finnis suggests, rightly I think, that this is not really a distinctive
characteristic of natural law theorizing as opposed to positivist theorizing. It simply states a position shared
by both that the bindingess of law (at least its moral bindingness, though possibly its legal bindingness) is
undermined by its iniquity. Finnis writes: “The meaning of “an unjust law is not a law” is essentially
identical to Hart's “This is law but too iniquitous to be applied or obeyed” (or availed of as a defense). The
excitement and hostility aroused amongst modern legal theorists (notably Hart) by the former way of
speaking is unwarranted. No one has difficulty in understanding locutions such as “an invalid argument is
no argument,” “a disloyal friend is not a friend,” “a quack medicine is not medicine,” and so forth. “Lex
iniusta non est lex” has the same logic; it acknowledges, in its opening words, that what is in question is in
certain important respects—perhaps normally and presumptively decisive respects—a law, but then in its
withdrawal or denial of that predicate it affirms that, since justice is the very point of having and respecting
law at all, this particular law's deficiency in justice deprives it of the decisive significance which all law
purports to have.” Finnis, John, “Natural Law Theories”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/naturallaw-theories/>. Finnis goes on to note that the “slogan-form locution” often attributed to Aquinas, viz., lex
iniusta non est lex, never actually occurs in his writings.
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morally required to obey the iniquitous demands of a political institution based on power.
The positivists object that they quite simply do not hold that position. Law demands our
obedience, but this is law’s demand, not a moral requirement, ie, political obligation does
not obtain, and the social fact of law has no inherent goodness, and indeed is prone to
significant abuse, and use for evil purposes. Nonetheless, many positivists seem to have
invited this confusion by suggesting that under their description of law it is more than a
brute, morally neutral, social fact, and has some kinds of inherent goodness.4
3. … and Positivists versus Empirical Legal Theorists
The rest of this paper will focus on an argument between empirical legal theory and legal
positivism with respect to their differing ontological and epistemic commitments.5
Positivists argue, as against natural lawyers, that they have a better critical stance for
considering positive law. They make this claim based on the idea that understanding law
as a morally neutral social fact affords a better critical stance because it makes no claim
about the goodness of law. What’s more, they claim, their description of this actually
existing socio-political institution, whatever flaws that institution might have, is better for
critiquing positive law than what natural lawyers offer precisely because it is a

4

A fuller exploration of this issue (no pun intended) is beyond the purview of this paper; but, briefly,
positivists invite this criticism by making various claims about law that seem to make of it significantly
more than a brute social fact, and indeed seem to claim for it various forms of goodness. For instance, Hart,
in The Concept of Law, (Oxford UP 1994 [1961]) is careful to distinguish “legal obligation” from merely
being “obliged” (6) or “coerced” (19). He intends to be countering Austin’s “gunman writ large” account of
the law by suggesting some rule of law virtue is constitutive of the structure of law. The more important
current thread comes out of Raz and his followers that law claims exclusionary or peremptory reasons for
action, ie, its reasons exclude or pre-empt our own moral reasoning. This claim relies on Raz’s service
conception of authority and says that law has authority precisely because (and insofar as) it uses its
authority to direct us in ways that we would ourselves choose based on our own interests and reasoning.
This is a wildly implausible description of the normal relationship of persons to actually existing positive
law, and not in line with an understanding of law as a social fact. Some very strong version of political
obligation would have to obtain in order for this to be the case, but the idea that political obligation obtains
seems to be an increasingly minority view amongst positivists, or at least that is the assessment of Leslie
Green. “A number of legal and political philosophers who do value government under law have become
sceptical, and reject both the Lockean and Humean traditions in favour of the view that there simply is no
general obligation to obey the law as traditionally conceived (515 “Law and Obligations” in Oxford
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, OUP (2002), J.Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.)).
William Edmundson, The Duty to Obey the Law, Rowman and Littlefield (1999) collects many important
highlights and is a useful introduction to the rich area of argumentation that is the discussion of political
obligation. For a careful critique of the Razian position along these lines see Kenneth Ehrenberg, “Law’s
Authority is not a Claim to Preemption,” in Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law, Wil
Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa, eds., Oxford UP, 2013. The most level headed take I have heard about
these ideas came from Ken Himma in a post paper discussion at a conference in Hamilton Ontario in May
of 2011. He said that, and I am paraphrasing, in general, the only reason he obeyed the law was for
prudential reasons, ie, there were serious consequences if one gets caught, and so it is prudent to obey.
Asked if he only avoided murder for prudential reasons he said of course not. He avoided murder and many
other things for moral reasons, NOT because they are illegal. His comments come across as devilish though
they jibe well with Donald Regan’s description of the ways in which saints would act in relation to law in a
society of saints, in “Law’s Halo” in Philosophy and Law, J Coleman and E Paul, eds., Oxford UP, 1987.
5
Insofar as natural lawyers are interested in fundamentally different sorts of questions they are likely to be
agnostic as to this argument. Insofar as they tend to take a side it is not qua natural lawyers that they do so.
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description of real law in the world. But on both the critical stance claim, and the
description of reality claim, the account of law provided by ELT does a better job.6
The virtues positivists claim for their account are rooted in it being a normatively neutral
description of reality, but ELT does a better job at this. As I have already suggested there
are various reasons we might theorize about law, but amongst the key reasons are
epistemic reasons. We theorize so that we can know the object in question, so that we can
know what the shape of the real world is. There are several elements to the epistemic
argument between positivists and empirical legal theorists (ELTs). Positivists look to the
legal systems of advanced states as their object, and claim that this is what in fact we
mean generally by law. They hold up this instance of law as the prime case and try to
deduce truths about law from their chosen exemplar. ELTs accept that state law is one
instance of what they understand law to be, but think it a mistake (and one that frequently
leads positivists astray) to try to understand the phenomenon of law based on this one
type of law. ELTs understand law to be a more generalized phenomenon of societies that
create mandatory normative requirements and some form of enforcement. Positivists
usually understand law to be an artefact, a purpose-built object of human creation, and
that as a consequence of this it presents in an epistemically special way that makes it
different from natural phenomena. ELTs think that law is a naturally occurring social
phenomenon7, something like human language, and as such is investigable and knowable
in the normal ways we know realities about the world. While there is nothing wrong with
taking state law as a discrete object of investigation, when it comes to one of the main
purposes of theorizing, namely having an epistemic tool for understanding the world, it
makes more sense to try to understand a range of phenomena with similar structures and
functions, as ELTs do. Now, because ELTs believe that law is a natural social
phenomenon they approach trying to know what it is – and having a theory about what it
is – as a sort of scientific problem. Positivists reject this idea and see law as something
artificial, knowable only through special means.
Against several positions commonly taken by positivists, I will argue that positions taken
by ELTs are more useful and fruitful. Some positivists reject the idea of theoretical
epistemic fruitfulness as important, or even workable. Rather than directly addressing this
I will try to show that the idea of law as artificial is unsustainable and not useful. But, if
law really is usefully understood as a naturally occurring social phenomenon, and not
artificial, this suggests that at least one important job for legal theory is serving the same
sorts of purposes that scientific theory does, namely, offering up a description of that
reality which attempts to describe the mechanisms that shape reality to be what it is.
Different legal theories have different purposes, which suggest different possible
normative drivers for theory selection. What sort of tool are we trying to build, what
work do we want it to do? I have just suggested that adequacy to reality and epistemic
6

Scott Shapiro, Legality, Belknap/Harvard UP, 2011, purports to be a positivist account of law, but it is
structural and functional in its description of law, and does not assume, as other positivists do, that law is
necessarily the product of modern internationally recognized states.
7
Just as we refer to human languages that come about in the normal way, through slow evolution that
involves various processes of transformation, as natural language, we could, not unreasonably, call this
position legal naturalism, ie, viewing law as a natural occurring object in the world, though here I will stick
with empirical legal theory so as to avoid potential confusion.
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fruit are important drivers if we conceive of law as a natural phenomenon. Positivism
generally shares this idea, but falls short in its normative commitment to epistemic
usefulness by limiting the range of phenomena in which it is interested to those of the
“state.” Positivists tend to either lean on the municipal/ international legal order for a
determination of the existence of states, or say that states are those things that have the
type of legal systems they are describing. The first position foists the problem on some
external determination of what is supposedly being theorized leaving a giant hole in the
middle of the theory, the second is circular. Whatever the justification of the limited
purview it is a problem when it comes to describing law in the real world. ELT shares the
separation and sources theses with positivism – law is different from morality, and its
existence and content are fully determined by its social sources. But, unlike positivism,
ELT understands the social sources of law to be an entirely contingent matter – the actual
social sources of law are whatever they happen to be.8 Each of the three camps also tries
8

There is a way to read Hart, his description of both the rule of recognition and his emphasis on the
internal point of view (POV), in a way that is, at least, close to the position of ELT. By Hart’s account we
know what law is by asking a particular social group who are responsible for law in a society what the law
is; this group has an implicit rule about recognizing law (the rule of recognition), and shares a sympathetic
view to the law (the internal POV). ELTs could say much the same thing – though they tend to emphasize
structures and functions, which can be determined from within or without – more on this below. Positivists
generally suggest that law is only a product of complex states and their theory suffers from the problems I
have just suggested. This does not mean, however, that the legal systems of complex states, recognized by
the international legal order, don’t in fact have to deal with law coming from other sources. This is
increasingly true of the phenomena now frequently referred to as transnational law, but has long been true
in colonial contexts. In the common law tradition when sovereignty passes from a pre-existing state to the
colonial power the standard way to deal with the pre-existing order is to incorporate it. Minimally this
involves the doctrine of continuity with respect to property, as outlined, for instance, by Viscount Haldane
in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1919] AC 211, where he writes, “A mere change in
sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners (233).” Kent McNeil offers
a good discussion in Common Law Aboriginal Title, Oxford UP, 1989, esp. at 165 to 179. Property systems
created outside of states properly understood can also come to enjoy state recognition and be incorporated,
as happened on the western frontier in 19th century USA. Hernando de Soto offers a good description of
this history in Chapter 5 of The Mystery of Capital, Basic Books, 2000, and argues that the real property
holdings of squatters in the slums surrounding developing world cities should be formalized with land
titles, and that this will activate capital in the favour of those land owners. A good description of property
law and land titles that exist in slums, independent from state law, is in Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “The
Law of the Oppressed: the Construction and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada,” 12 Law and Society
Review 1, (1977) [Pasargada]. De Soto’s idea of creating wealth through formalizing such titles is not
without its problems, see, for instance, my discussion in “Power Dynamics, Social Complexity and the
Rule of Law in Development Aid,” 2 Transnational Legal Theory 1, 25-65 (2011). The positivist sources
thesis says that law comes from recognized sources of law, generally legislative statutes, judicial decisions,
and constitutions, however these be written and ratified. Nonetheless, everyone is aware that there is an
inter-play between the political sphere, broadly understood, and the legal realm, especially when it comes
to sources for law. For the legislative branch that connection is explicit and obvious. Robert Cover in
“Nomos and Narrative,” 97 Harv. L. Rev 4 (1983-1984) describes the sources of law as rooted in
communities of commitment. Cover is most interested in large advanced states, and especially the USA, the
kind of states about which positivists are generally most interested. Within such states there is a whole
range of communities imbricated throughout the territory. Legislatures and courts, by Cover’s account, act
more as filters and ratifiers of norms generated by communities. He is most keenly interested in the ways in
which communities try to shape the normative understanding of the public sphere and the shape of the law,
and end up in litigation about their claims as to what the law is. By his description the norms these
communities generate are already law at the moment they are generated by these communities, ie, the
communities are jurisgenerative. In the confrontation with opposing litigants (typically, though not
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to claim that they offer an effective critical perspective on actually existing positive law.
Now, while it is also possible to select a legal theory for the good consequences for
political morality that flow from it, that is not my key point in this essay.9 We can
usefully think of the empirical approach to legal theory as a version of legal positivism
that is more faithful to its neutral descriptive goal.10

uniquely, the government), the courts must decide whether to accede to this understanding of the law, or, in
Cover’s description, to kill off that communally created law. In large states, by this account, law is always
springing into existence, and it is one of the key roles of the courts of the state to maintain enough
coherence amongst the varying points of view of what the law is by continually restraining the creation of
such law, by killing it, by engaging in its jurispathic role. Independent of what one thinks of Cover’s
description, the reality that the sources of law are ultimately in places behind those identified by the
standard positivist account is obvious, though, this is importantly a matter of description. Legal positivist’s
do not deny the political sources of law behind their legal sources, but simply see it as beyond the purview
of legal theory proper. Asked about the source of a river the geographer plots a point on a map, the
hydrologist talks about the rain, its sources and the watershed – there is no argument between them, just a
difference of perspective.
9
I briefly noted above that there are good consequences for political morality that flow from ELT, insofar
as ELT does a better job at providing a morally neutral description of social facts than does positivism, the
basis upon which positivists generally claim the moral preferability of positivism. That argument is not my
focus here. The “beneficial moral consequences” as an aspect that might affect the choice of legal theory
has a significant pedigree despite the suggestion by some that there is something untoward about its
consideration. An oft cited essay on this topic is Liam Murphy’s “The Political Question of the Concept of
Law,” in Hart’s Postscript, Oxford UP, ed. Jules Coleman (2001). In footnote 6 (373) Murphy lists allies
in his argument (MacCormick, Schauer, Raz and Lyons) as well as detractors (Soper and Waluchow). Julie
Dickson, “Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survery,” Legal Theory, 10 (2004) 117, addresses the
viability of such an approach and focuses on Murphy. She writes: “[H]is position seems to commit him to
the view that which legal theory we espouse is partly a matter of choice and that the choice is to be made
on moral and political consequentialist grounds. … This position has attracted criticism from some for
appearing to turn legal theory into a form of wishful thinking (148).” This topic is also central in Dickson’s,
Evaluation and Legal Theory, Hart (2001). Frederick Schauer, “The Social Construction of the Concept of
Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson,” OJLS, Vol 25 No 3 (2005) 493-501, offers a strong reply to Dickson. He
also takes note, rightly I think, that in the Hart-Fuller debate that “although the two plainly disagreed over
which concept of law … would best facilitate disobedience to evil directives, they intriguingly agreed that
the tendency of a concept of law to facilitate such an attitude should count in its favour (495).”
10
Now, while I think an empirical account of law does a better job of providing a general theory of law,
and, indeed a better position from which to engage in the moral criticism of law, I do not think that
positivists and natural lawyers are simply wasting their time (and ours). Natural lawyers think that nondefective law facilitates a social arrangement that aims at the human good. And this is no doubt the case for
non-defective (or, the best of all possible worlds) law. Thinking about the demands of such law is no doubt
a valuable exercise. I would characterize it as a certain kind of exercise in theorizing about political
morality. Theorizing about natural law, and political morality, by the way, would no doubt benefit from a
strong infusion of naturalization – knowing what the good is for human beings, what makes them healthy
and happy, can be greatly informed through ongoing empirical investigation. The positivist account of law
focuses on state legal institutions from the perspective of insiders. Professional law schools primarily
educate practitioners whose advocacy and interactions will be with state legal institutions, and so it is not
inappropriate that law school students are given a solid dose of legal positivism. Nonetheless, as currently
conceived positivism has shortcomings in describing new developing areas of law, law from other
societies, inter-jurisdictional and non-state forms of law, as well as difficulty in accounting for the
possibility of revolutionary changes in legal institutions. The positivist account serves as a good
introduction for the Western law student. Hart, for instance, intended The Concept of Law to be a primer for
just such students, but even in the case of the law of modern Western states a scientific view does a better
job of accounting for the realities of law.
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I turn now to a recent paper by Brian Leiter11 in which he argues, amongst other things,
that we should conceive of law as an artefact of human production, and thus as having
distinct epistemic properties. I will try to refute his description. I then turn to a wider
ranging consideration of arguments between those who conceive of law as a naturally
occurring social phenomenon knowable by normal epistemic standards, and those who
argue that it is epistemically special. In the latter parts of the paper I turn to the idea of
naturalization in epistemology, especially as applied to law. I argue that ELTs, including
American Legal Realists, can fairly be described as taking a naturalist position, and that
Leiter’s description of what such a position entails is mistaken.
4. Demarcation put to Bed
In “Demarcation Problem” Brian Leiter argues that efforts to describe the essence of law,
and to so distinguish law from morality, should be abandoned, since they have no
prospect of success.12 He argues that law, like science, is an artefact concept – it
identifies the product of a human endeavour – and that as with the long running attempt
(and failure) to distinguish science from non-science, the attempt to demarcate law from
morality is doomed to failure.13 He thus presents what he calls a new case for scepticism.
He intends to lay the misbegotten demarcation project to rest. I concur with his
conclusion that efforts to demarcate law from morality, by defining their necessary and
essential properties, should be laid to rest, though I think he is somewhat misrepresenting
the problem and its resolution. Casting the problem as being that of demarcating law
from morality is too narrow. While this has frequently been a focus of legal philosophers
a more important contemporary problem is that of demarcating law from other law-like
normative systems whether they claim to be law (or morality) or not. Related to this point
is the work that artefacticity does in Leiter’s argument. Artefact concepts point out
objects of human creation, like chairs, objects for which the definition of necessary and
essential properties is notoriously difficult, if not impossible. Leiter suggests there is no
need to argue for the artefacticity of the concept of law, as “something that necessarily
owes its existence to human activities intended to create” it, and those who would deny
this have extravagant “metaphysical commitments” that would be the subject of
“psychological, not philosophical investigation.”14 This is something like a pre-emptive
ad hominem defence of his argument, but leave that aside. Leiter says that naturalists and
positivists alike agree that law is an artefact; certainly neither makes outrageous claims
about the positive law falling out of the heavens, either from god, or from an asteroid, but
the claim involves more than that, which I will address below.
What was hoped for from the demarcation project in the philosophy of science was a
shortcut that would make it possible to distinguish between epistemically serious
11

B Leiter, “The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism,” 32 OJLS 1 (2012) 1
[“Demarcation Problem”]
12
ibid
13
Leiter says that his article “owes its existence to a conversation with Larry Laudan” (ibid 1) and quotes
from Larry Laudan, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’ in Robert S. Cohen and Larry Laudan (eds),
Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (D Reidel 1983) (5-7) to lay out the rise and fall of the
demarcation problem in the philosophy of science.
14
Leiter, n11, 4
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attempts to account for reality and non-serious explanations of the phenomenal world.
Laudan describes the crux of the problem as follows:
Through certain vagaries of history … we have managed to conflate two quite
distinct questions: what makes a belief well founded (or heuristically fertile)? And
what makes a belief scientific? The first set of questions is philosophically
interesting and possibly even tractable; the second question is both uninteresting
and, judging by its checkered past, intractable.15
Leiter draws the parallel between the efforts in the philosophy of science and in
jurisprudence to describe necessary and essential properties to distinguish artefacts
(science or law, or indeed, chairs) from those things with which they might be confused
(junk science or morality, or stumps of logs). But Laudan’s point about the ongoing
philosophical interest and even tractability of the better-put question (about what makes a
belief well-founded or heuristically fertile) is important. If we put Leiter’s demarcation
problem in jurisprudence to bed, then where are we left? Law and morality both still exist
– though the shortcut to their distinction is gone. Leiter suggests that “[s]ome traditional
jurisprudents think a solution to the Demarcation Problem would help”16 answer
particular legal/moral questions about things such as whether the US Constitution’s
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment means that the death
penalty is, or should be, legally valid. But it quite simply doesn’t. It can be legally valid
and yet morally unacceptable. Leiter goes on to take issue with Dworkin’s
characterization of positivism. The bottom line for Leiter, however, is that dispatching
with the demarcation project leaves us in the appropriate position of directly addressing
the practical considerations of what ought to be done.17
Leiter goes on with some choice words for positivists he sees as engaging in ongoing and
increasingly “baroque” efforts to solve the demarcation problem, or in the case of natural
lawyers, their claim to solve the problem with a “transparent change of the topic.”18
I take no issue with Leiter’s suggestion that we let the problem go and get on with
analyses of what ought to be done. But I think putting the demarcation problem to bed
and arriving at a new sceptical position has consequences for how we think about law; I
don’t just mean that as a practical matter we can turn our attention to answering moral
questions about what ought to be done knowing that solving the demarcation problem
does not represent an alternative to doing so. If there are no shortcuts to demarcating
science from epistemic junk, or law from other claims to normative ordering, then this
new sceptical position still leaves us with questions about “well-founded” or
“heuristically fruitful” beliefs, as Laudan notes. But, what are well-founded or
heuristically fruitful beliefs about law? Leiter has staked out some ground for a possible
answer to this question in claiming that the artefacticity of law is completely
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uncontroversial. Unfortunately the ground he has staked out, on closer scrutiny, proves to
be barren soil.
5. Artefacts
What is an artefact? Here I will make some common sense observations and rely entirely
on Risto Hilpinen19 as a philosophical source. Hilpinen traces the idea back to at least
Aristotle who distinguished between natural objects and artificial objects – or objects that
have an author. Hilpinen points out that animals have been found to fashion and use tools
so authorship is not limited to human beings. Some animals construct items for specific
purposes, such as wasps constructing storage vessels, and do so, at least it is conceived,
wholly out of instinct, and so without intention, and, substituting usefulness for intention,
these are sometimes called “animal artifacts.”20 In the manufacture of goods there are the
objects intended and the by-products – the latter of which, anthropologists also think of
as artefacts. As to their ontology, artefacts, Hilpinen suggests, are of various types, or can
be conceived of in various ways. As already noted, the authorial intention to create an
object is one standard hallmark. So, “all works of art, including musical and literary
works, should be called “artifacts” insofar as they have authors.”21 How objects present
themselves in the material world is one possible parameter of description, so they might
be “singular, concrete object[s] such as the Eiffel Tower, a type (a type of object) which
has or can have many instances (for example, a paper clip…), an instance of a type (a
particular paper clip), or an abstract object, for example, an artificial language.”22
Artefacts can be portable, or, like a rail tunnel, “a non-separable feature of an object
which serves as its substrate or foundation.”23 Hilpinen notes that, “[a]rtifacts are
classified in different ways: on the basis of their form, the method of manufacture,
material properties, style, their intended use, or on other grounds.”24 He goes on to note
other ways we might classify artefacts, such as through their modes of production or their
intended purpose. Indeed, he notes, “[t]he study of artifacts … is intrinsically evaluative,
since viewing an object as an artifact means viewing it in the light of intentions and
purposes.”25 But take the last mentioned specific example, ie, an artificial language.
Artificial languages are artefacts, but natural languages, according to Hilpinen are not.
“Languages and words can be natural entities (without identifiable creators) or artifacts
which have been intentionally designed for a specific purpose.”26 So Esperanto, and C+,
and even “New Norwegian”27 are artefacts, but natural languages, like English, are, as the
19
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phrase suggests, natural objects, that is, not artefacts. And, of course, human beings are
also not artefacts, they are animals and part of the natural world.
Now, it seems to me that not just Leiter, but much modern jurisprudence, puts an awful
lot of weight on the idea of artefact, artefacticity, artifice, artificiality or whatever we
might want to call it. Law is something we make, and that makes understanding it special
and radically different from understanding things we don’t make. Nonsense!
Distinguishing artefacts from natural objects is a perfectly fine commonsensical
distinction, but when philosophers try to get it to do the sort of conceptual work Leiter
(and many others) try to get it to do, without giving serious consideration to what this
means, it turns into an awful conceptual muddle, and worse than useless. The English
language and Western civilization are not artefacts because they do not have authors;
they were not purpose-built by identifiable producers. But there are elements of each that
were purpose-built by specific authors. Many word coinages, and many specific laws,
institutions, buildings and works of art that are part of Western civilization also have
authors. But the idea that in every case we could define the authorship, or that in every
case there is a grand design to it all, beggars imagination. What about the Linux operating
system? Certainly it is designed with a purpose,28 though actually ascertaining authorship
of any advanced version would likely be impossible – these Neurathian boat-builders29
would have so many unknown names it would only be possible to call it an ever-rebuilt
boat of no clear ownership or builder. How do we draw a line between all the
complicated cases of artefacts and natural objects? More importantly, what conceivable
theoretical work or goal could that accomplish? Leiter has laid to rest one unworkable
distinction only to hang his hat on another; having set aside the notion that there might be
a quick, easy and useful distinction between law and ethics (or as I would put it, law and
other related normative systems), or in the case of epistemology, between science and
quackery, Leiter now hopes, for purposes of knowing and theorizing, that there is a quick,
easy and useful distinction in the observation that something is an artefact (or
hermeneutic concept30), rather than a natural kind object. There isn’t, and so the idea of
artefact cannot do the work Leiter wants it to do.
Now Leiter, and all those who agree with him, say that law is an artefact. Certainly
individual pieces of legislation, or particular judicial decisions, can reasonably be
understood as artefacts. And no doubt there is something to the idea that human activity
produces the law with intention. But the same is true of the English language. If we are
unlike modern Italian. Despite these attempts to regulate the language they remain natural languages whose
development is controlled by the community of language users and not by the academies.
28
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interested in understanding the realities of the world, then it makes more sense to think of
law as being like the English language, that is, more like a natural object (though
humanly created). Developing a story of the difficulty of making a useful distinction of
artefacts from natural objects could take me down the road of animal learning and culture
– things which human prejudice has generally, and wrongly, dismissed as nonsense.
6. Epistemology after the Death of Demarcation
When Laudan puts the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science to bed he still
thinks that we are left with important questions about epistemically serious investigation
versus quackery.
Insofar as our concern is to protect ourselves and our fellows from the cardinal sin
of believing what we wish were so rather than what there is substantial evidence
for (and surely that is what most forms of ‘quackery’ come down to), then our
focus should be squarely on the empirical and conceptual credentials for claims
about the world. The ‘scientific’ status of those claims is altogether irrelevant.31
We use the word “science” as an honorific. It does not have a definite meaning but is
merely an eponym attached to what demarcationists thought might be a definable terrain,
namely beliefs about the world for which there are good “empirical and conceptual
credentials”, that is beliefs that are epistemically good or have objective doxastic quality.
The project of finding a shortcut to the determination of objective doxastic quality was
not to be found, but Laudan still thinks that there is such a thing. He doesn’t like the word
“science,” for some of the same reasons I don’t like the word “law,” but neither is going
away anytime soon.32
7. Empirical Legal Theorists and Border Guards: Scientific versus Definitional
Approaches to Theorizing “Law” and the Question of Scope
The degree to which legal phenomena are amenable to scientific investigation is a key
difference in theoretical perspective between positivists and empirical legal theorists.
Some authors, such as Raz and Tamanaha, have insisted that law is absolutely not
amenable to scientific investigation. Brian Leiter, on the other hand, in earlier work, has
argued for what he calls a naturalized jurisprudence.33 Leiter looks to American Legal
Realism (ALR) as a mode of scientific investigation of the real world functioning of legal
institutions and norm generation. Unfortunately Leiter, in what has become a popular
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misconception, represents American legal realism as a theory of adjudication rather than
a functional account of law. As William Twining notes:
Brian Leiter uses his version of ‘naturalism’ to reinterpret American Legal
Realism. We agree that Realism was caricatured by Hart and others, that most
Realist views are compatible with positivism, and that there should be a close
connection between conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry, with which we are
both sympathetic. But Leiter’s account is historically skewed in that he treats
American Legal Realism as a theory about adjudication and reasoning about
disputed questions of law, omitting entirely, for example, Frank’s concern with
questions of fact, the empirical studies of Moore at Yale and Oliphant and others
at Johns Hopkins, Llewellyn’s ‘law jobs’ theory, and other extra-judicial studies
of law-related behaviour – in short, some of the most original and interesting
products of the Realist Movement. It is odd to call an almost exclusive focus on
judicial reasoning in hard (typically appellate) cases realistic.34
Twining looks to American legal realism for an account of law as something that
“naturally” emerges out of the realities of groups of people trying to preserve their
existence as groups. This sort of view of law, as a naturally occurring phenomenon within
complex social groups, is the hallmark of ELT.
Brian Tamanaha, in, ‘An Analytical Map of Social Scientific Approaches to the Concept
of Law,’35 undertakes a fairly comprehensive review of the twentieth century’s history of
social scientific accounts of law. This review seems to be mostly an effort to prove that
these accounts must surely fail, because they are inadequate to the task of distinguishing
law, properly understood, from other phenomena that are structurally-functionally related
– or what I would call conceptual border patrol. His analysis is rooted in a distinction he
draws between “two fundamental categories of the concept of law.”36 “The first category
[, the social scientific view,] sees law in terms of actual patterns of behaviour; the second
category sees law in terms of the state law model.”37 He argues throughout that the social
scientific account either becomes too vague and all-encompassing of socially normative
activities, or, conversely, is completely conceptually dependent on the state law model.
But this is only true to the extent that the socio-legal scholars he looks to share his
emphasis on conceptual border patrol – and many of them don’t. In the middle of his
argument he looks to Donald Black, in “The Boundaries of Legal Sociology,”38 as
someone who understands science but who does not understand the inability of science to
investigate “law.” Tamanaha writes:
Pound's view of law is represented today in the work of Donald Black, who sets
his analysis in a more sophisticated scientific framework. Black believes that
34
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‘science can know only phenomena and never essences’39; he concluded that ‘the
quest for the one correct concept of law or for anything else “distinctively legal”
is therefore inherently unscientific’40. From this standpoint the question what is
law? was not an analytical one; rather, it was just a matter of designating the
phenomenon to be studied by legal sociologists. Thus Black simply stipulated that
‘law is governmental social control’41, thereby sidestepping the entire debate.42
But Tamanaha is simply misrepresenting Black here. Black writes, “I like to define law
simply as governmental social control. This is one possibility among many consistent
with a positivist [ie, scientific] strategy.”43 And a bit further on: “Ultimately a theory is
known and judged by its statements about the world. These statements both guide and
follow empirical research.”44 Rather than sidestepping the debate, as Tamanaha suggests,
Black has grasped the problem with more clarity than Tamanaha. Black understands that
theory is useful insofar as it facilitates empirical research and that these two must
interact. Thus any “definition” of law that one deploys in such an exercise is always
heuristic – it is a tool in a scientific enterprise, not a hill to be defended in an ideological
battle. He clearly intends his brief functional description of “governmental social control”
to function in precisely this sort of way.
Tamanaha, on the other hand, seems to believe that conceptual reification is simply of the
essence of the legal theoretical project.45 He returns to Black at the end of the essay, more
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blatantly misrepresenting him to create a straw man. But beyond that Tamanaha gets
close to acknowledging the good sense that Black’s position makes, though still
obsessing about vocabulary. “Black should have just said ‘governmental social control’ is
an important phenomenon which must be studied.”46 Of course, this is what Black did
say, without asserting that such a phenomenon was the “essence” of law. Further on
Tamanaha notes that the term law is,
… conventionally applied to a variety of multifaceted, multifunctional
phenomena: natural law, international law, primitive law, religious law,
customary law, state law, folk law, people’s law, and indigenous law on the
general level, and an almost infinite variety on the specific level, from the state
law of Massachusetts to the law of the Barotse, from the law of Nazi Germany to
the Nuremberg trials. If there is a shared trait to the various phenomena which
carry the tag ‘law’, it’s that they all lay claim to legitimate authority, to rightful
power. This quality more than anything else is what makes law – in all of its
many incarnations – so potentially dangerous. This study will certainly be
facilitated by the construction of comparative frameworks like ‘institutionalized
norm enforcement,’ as long as these frameworks are not then taken to be law.
Unfortunately, the increasingly popular concept of legal pluralism is grounded
upon precisely this error, and revives all of the old problems surrounding the
social scientific concept of law.47
But Tamanaha’s approach, like all definitional approaches, is ultimately question begging
– this is law because I, or we, call it law. Sometimes such forms of question begging are
inevitable and unproblematic, when they are limited. But my concern, like Black’s, is not
a definitional concern around the word “law,” but rather a concern with the conceptual
arena within which the investigation of a range of structurally-functionally related social
phenomena occur, ie, with precisely such things as “institutionalized norm enforcement.”
If the word “law” is to have any generalized utility, as typically conceived of in general
jurisprudence projects, it has to be by means of such understandings of real world
phenomena that have particular shapes and functions in societies.
Unfortunately the general tenor of the border guards seems to be that there is something
improper or untoward about associating and trying to understand a range of phenomena
that includes what they understand by law along with other related phenomena. But the
position. While some of his criticisms are well aimed his argument at its core rests on this same issue. In B
Tamanaha, General Jurisprudence, OUP (2001) he searches for a cross-cultural concept of law in natural
language. He suggests that we go around to different legal cultures and find out what these different
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“Law is whatever people identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law’ (or recht, or droit, etc.)
(194).” W Twining, “A Post-Westphalian Conception of Law,”37 Law and Society Review 1, 199 (2003)
argues, and he is absolutely right, that Tamanaha’s “labelling test” (223) is unworkable. One key reason is
that there are serious problems with natural language translation. But this links up importantly with the
issue of the distinction between folk and analytic concepts in legal anthropology (229). Ultimately we are
interested in an analytic concept that relates to a particular set of social structures and functions (across
different cultures) independent of how those are mapped out by the local folk.
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real impropriety arises when one tries to account for “legal” phenomena to the exclusion
of related phenomena. In extremis this would amount to being unwilling to venture into
any normative discussion of what the law related to some issue should be.
I teach a course in law and globalization. The realities of inter-jurisdictional competition
and mobile capital underpin the analysis of almost all the real world problems we discuss
in that class. These realities mean that imagining shaping law to create a better world runs
up against the rough edge of governmental and legal impotence. Thinking beyond the
strictures of the definitional approach to law is the only way such a course can have any
real content, which does not mean there is something wrong with the course or its
location in a law school. It does mean that when we look to the world and the jobs law is,
or should be, doing we find a range of forces that (sometimes) coincide with a range of
normative orders.48
8. Raz on the Artificiality of Law – Hermeneutic Concepts
Raz shares Leiter’s position on the non-naturalness of law, and hence its special
epistemic status. He says, “[I]t would be wrong to conclude, as D. Lyons has done, that
one judges the success of an analysis of the concept of law by its theoretical sociological
fruitfulness. To do so is to miss the point that, unlike concepts like ‘mass’ or ‘electron’,
‘the law’ is a concept used by people to understand themselves.”49 Leiter takes note of
this position of Raz’s and understands it as a claim that “the law” is a “hermeneutic
concept.”50 Raz is clearly distinguishing concepts about things in the natural world from
this different kind of concept, and relating this to the way such things might be known.
Raz (and Leiter) want the idea of a “hermeneutic concept” to do similar work to that
which Leiter imagines for artefact concept, viz., to create a special epistemic status for
law (or anything else to which these terms appropriately apply). As with the idea that
describing “law” as an artefact concept explains its special epistemic status, the idea that
“law” is a hermeneutic concept hangs more on a common sense idea than that idea can
sustain.
In unpacking Raz’s idea Leiter is careful to note that there are lots of natural kind
concepts – precisely the sorts of things to which Raz has pointed, viz., electrons, for
instance – that play “hermeneutic roles: “gold” in bourgeois societies … “water” in many
religious baptismal rituals, or “wolverine” in Michigan… Yet none of this makes these
concepts Hermeneutic Concepts, because we do not take their extension to be fixed by
the hermeneutic roles they do or might play… .”51 Leiter says that Hart argues that we
must treat “law” as a hermeneutic concept, otherwise, “… we will not be able to
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distinguish its extension from that of habitual social practices… .”52 Elsewhere in the
essay he describes this as Hart accepting the “hermeneutic constraint on accounts of
social phenomena: to wit, that an adequate description of a human social practice must
attend to how the participants in the practice understand its meaning and purpose.”53 So,
according to Leiter’s interpretation of Raz, the extension of law, the real-world
application of the term, is fixed by coming to understand what those who function within
the system understand its extension to be. We might call this epistemic hard internalism –
the idea that it is only from the internal point of view that the object can be known.
Priests engaged in baptisms have an internal description of the hermeneutics of “water,”
it says things like the water cleanses the soul, it initiates the child into the community of
faith, or what have you, but there is an external description of water beyond the priest’s
account which is its physical description, H2O, and all the myriad things that entails
beyond its role in baptisms. The hermeneutic account of water is partial; water is
importantly and requisitely understood in non-hermeneutic ways, in ways that are quite
beyond its role in our understanding of our rituals. But, according to Leiter, “law” is not a
natural thing (described by a natural kind concept) that plays a hermeneutic role, but
rather it is an artificial thing whose entire extension is circumscribed by its hermeneutic
role. If we understand the hermeneutics of “law,” if we understand what role it plays in
shaping the meaning of the lives of those who accept and live within it, then we
understand all there is to understand about law.
Leiter (and Raz’s) idea, then, relies at least in part on the claim of the artificiality of law,
which I have already addressed. This is another twist, in which it is the role the concept
plays in a self-explanatory story, that distinguishes it from other concepts and gives it a
special epistemic status. But the hermeneutic role that “law” plays is just like that of
“water” in the baptism ritual. Just as a priest, with no contradiction, can be a chemist, so
too can a lawyer, judge or legal theorist, with no contradiction, be an anthropologist.
Leiter suggests that if we take the external point of view we will fail to distinguish law
from other law-like phenomena. Now, while using the internal point of view is one useful
way to gain insights into the object in question, the idea that it is necessarily exhaustive
of the potential modes of understanding is wrongheaded. The internal and external points
of view are complimentary to each other. A single knower trying to understand a single
example of a social phenomenon, such as law, can usefully switch between internal and
external points of view. The idea that trying to understand law must be limited to the
internal point of view otherwise we will fail to distinguish “law” from “habitual social
practices”, that is, that we must restrict our epistemic tools or we will be led astray, is
wrong.54 I will revisit the issue of epistemic points of view in more detail below.
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For the moment let me try to unpack a little more carefully the idea of a hermeneutic
concept. For Raz and Leiter a hermeneutic concept is a concept we use to understand
ourselves, like culture. But to say that we use such terms to understand ourselves does not
mean that they render normal investigation using normal epistemic standards into the
reality of the phenomena in question impossible. When we refer to culture we might use
it in vague and amorphous ways to start with, referring generally to Spanish culture, for
instance. But to say that the Spanish have a culture, or to attribute something to being a
characteristic or product of Spanish culture does not mean that it is incapable of further
investigation. We might use the term in general ways, but unless it cashes out with
greater specificity then it does not help us understand ourselves, or others, it merely
obfuscates. Surely by suggesting that there is something distinctive about Spanish culture
we mean there are myriad distinctive patterns of behaviour – kinds of music, dance, food,
styles of architecture, habits around meals and conversation, eating late and staying up
half the night, sleeping in the afternoon, etc. And, no doubt, if I want to understand
Spanish culture really well I would do so best by immersing myself to the point that I
speak, live and dream like a Spaniard, to the point that when I cross the border to France
with my Spanish friends I am mistaken for one of the loud Latin neighbours. But even if I
do all this it does not negate the reality that there is much about Spanish culture that is
objectively describable and knowable. And, if my project of complete absorption into lo
español is successful, still, by the mere fact that my non-Spanish identity is not
completely absorbed, I might have insights into Spanish culture via my external point of
view that the Spaniard herself does not see, can not see.55
Raz seems to be suggesting that social phenomena are not subject to scientific
investigation, but he is wrong, they are, and the vocabulary we use in that science, like all
scientific vocabulary, must adjust to new meanings as the science develops. The claim by
positivists that the thing they describe is law, and what social scientists investigate is a
range of phenomena with some shared properties with law, but it isn’t law, is not a
reasonable way to decide who “owns” the term “law”.
9. Understanding the Phenomenal World with Concepts – Moving Beyond
Definition

norms understood as obligatory and conjoined to enforcement for something to be law, and to argue
otherwise is attacking a straw man. If people follow this pattern because of obligatory enforced norms then
it meets the basic test. Perhaps the hard internalist claim is that it is only possible to know about the
normative content by assuming the internal POV, but this is also wrong. I can discern the existence of a
norm within a community from a wholly external POV. There are lots of other questions we might start to
ask about such laws and the social institutions that make them work, or make them valid, but many other
questions we might want to know the answers to will not call into question that the system is law unless we
discard the social and separation theses.
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Or consider a perhaps more practical use of the idea of culture. When a business analyst refers to a
cultural problem within a company s/he means that there is a set of habits, attitudes, mores that have
become common amongst some or all of the people who make up the company. If new management is
brought in to fix the culture of the company then they are trying to get people in the company to change
specific habits, attitudes and mores. A hermeneutic concept can only function hermeneutically insofar as it
has some real specific content, which is discoverable in the normal ways, using normal epistemic standards.

18
For those willing to move beyond this concern for conceptual border patrol (or at least
view it as merely secondary) it seems to correlate with a rise of either agnosticism or
despair about a unified concept of law. But a unified concept of law is both possible and
needed. An account of law that sees it as a naturally occurring phenomenon of human
societies offers that possibility. Every society has norms and institutionalized
enforcement mechanisms. A structural-functional description of the common elements of
these phenomena, that is sufficiently heuristic to adapt as it is used, is what ELT puts
forth, and satisfies the need for a common concept. Such a concept should be driven and
measured by epistemic utility and fruitfulness.
Such an approach suggests evaluative criteria and methods distinct from much legal
philosophy. By taking up a scientific perspective wherein the value of concepts is in their
capacity to help us understand the world, we invert a typical analytic strategy, which I
call the definitional approach. The typical strategy is as follows: I take my
intuitive/inchoate concept of law into the world and see what I find. Based on this
encounter between initial concept and the world I refine my concept and make
clarifications, including distinctions between my concept and related but different
concepts. I define and refine. This definitional approach leads to conceptual reification.56
Law is X. There may be other things that are related to X in various ways, but these are
not my objects of study.
The scientific strategy necessarily begins in the same place with an encounter between
my intuitive/inchoate concepts and the world they are intended to describe, but as a
scientist I am interested in understanding the world as best I can. That is, I see the value
or truth of concepts as lying in their ability to facilitate an understanding of all of the
inter-related phenomena of the world.57 Scientists spend most of their time digging
deeper and not wider – but there are no artificial limits to the scope of inquiry – as there
frequently are within many accounts of the concept of law. From this perspective, a
focus on drawing distinctions between true or real law, and other law-like phenomena, is
both uninteresting and mistaken. There is a range of phenomena, between different
societies and within any given society, that function in law-like ways. From a scientific
point of view these are all valuable objects of study, and insofar as understanding these
phenomena together casts more light on the way the world works, (which it does), then
having a conceptual apparatus that encompasses this range of phenomena is the right way
to proceed.
For many legal philosophers my suggestion that there is a range of law-like phenomena is
completely unproblematic, yet they remain insistent on distinguishing “law-like”
phenomena from “law.” A fairly standard line from the border guards is that failing to
engage in border guard work simply allows the conceptual waters to be muddied. They
see theories that would broaden the scope of investigation as conflating different issues,
and opt instead for an artificial clarity, preferring arbitrariness to conflation. This is a
mistake. Picking one concept of law, generally state law, as the standard-bearer of the
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moniker “law” to the exclusion of all else is problematic for knowledge reasons, just as it
would be to pick out the practices of experimental physicists and call this “science,” to
the exclusion of all other practices, because the term “law” just like “science” is an
honorific. At least with the term “science” there is fairly general clarity about how the
honorific is intended to function, what good things make the use of the term apply,
namely, high epistemic quality, or objective doxastic virtue, generally related to
quantifiable aspects of the phenomenal world whose method of determination is well
described and repeatable. In the case of the honorific “law” there is a great deal more
confusion about what the supposed goodness referred to is. The long running
disagreement between natural lawyers and legal positivists seems to have spread a
generalized confusion amongst the average citizen, and many in the legal community as
well. The muddled view that law somehow aims towards the good, and is at the same
time fundamentally a tool of political elites, and of each element of this muddled view
that it is both true and false, seems to be the most widely diffused view (insofar as we can
call that a “view”) about what is “good” about the law. And, nonetheless, the word comes
charged with connotations of power and legitimacy. 58 The term law is both damaged and
yet remains invaluable. It would be better if it were not used as an honorific, but this is
likely to continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. The only reasonable solution is
to refine the vocabulary we use as we clarify the range of law-like phenomena in the
world. What I foresee is a range of related phenomena of which no single one will be able
to claim the unique name of law. “Law” then, will be the family name of a group of
related phenomena whose various members will have different names, which needn’t
necessarily include the surname, that is, we might speak of some member of the family
without calling it law.
10. Naturalization, Epistemic Seriousness and Empirical Legal Theory
A more precise vocabulary for discussing the range of law-related phenomena will only
be achieved by examining and describing such phenomena as what they actually are.
Brian Leiter has frequently invoked the idea of epistemic naturalization as a way of
distinguishing epistemically serious efforts to understand law from hokum. As I have
already suggested I have great sympathy for this part of his work.
First, I think it is important to clarify what Leiter means by naturalization, as there is
some ambiguity about the term. There is a significant body of philosophical work on
epistemic naturalization originating with WVO Quine that explores the nature of the
project of epistemology generally, the viability of foundations theory, and the connection
between the project of epistemology and the project of the sciences.59 There is also
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A serious discussion of epistemological naturalization, the motives and goals of the program, and the
controversies it generates, is beyond the scope of this paper, much less this footnote. Nonetheless, a brief
comment is warranted. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Knowledge is generally understood to be
justified true belief. Much epistemology, then, turns on the question of when we are justified in holding
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some belief. Early twentieth century epistemology turned increasingly towards these normative questions
of justification from an a priori perspective. Naturalization is a response to this emphasis on the a priori.
WVO Quine, at least early on, argues for naturalizing epistemology in the sense of eliminating the
normative question of the justification of beliefs, (see his “Epistemology Naturalized” in W Quine,
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia UP (1969).) The question for the early Quine is not
what beliefs we are justified in having, but rather what the causal connection between sense experience and
beliefs is. (In a sense he is externalizing the justification question – looking to the sciences for a set of
beliefs whose worthiness of being held is established by their utility in the scientific project and the results
they provide in predicting things about the world. He then wants to be scientific in figuring out how these
beliefs are arrived at.) How in fact do we come to have the beliefs that we have? This radical program faces
pointed criticism on several fronts. Jaegwon Kim, (What is Naturalized Epistemology?, Philosophical
Perspectives, Vol.2, Epistemology 381 (1988)) argues that the question of the causal connections between
sense data experience and theoretical beliefs leaves open the normative questions about the value of those
beliefs and theories, and so the eliminative program might have merit as a research program, but is a
different project from normative epistemology. The more modest proposal for naturalizing epistemology is
simply that we should conceive of epistemology as sharing its extension with science. Epistemology should
not be thought of as somehow logically anterior to the rest of the sciences, but only a more abstract portion
of general scientific investigation. This cashes out in two primary ways. First, we should focus on
knowledge as a psychological phenomenon. Since knowing is a human activity a naturalized epistemology
continually bears in mind the capacities and limitations of human beings. Ought implies can, and so
practical epistemological issues relate to the ways in which the cognitive architecture built into the human
animal works. This closely connects to the second point, namely, the ongoing interaction with empirical
investigation. Since epistemology is part and parcel of a wider scientific project of investigating the world,
what we learn about the contingent realities of human psychology will impact our understanding of the
project of knowledge generally. For instance, investigation into various kinds of perception bias can be an
invaluable empirical input into a naturalized epistemology. The feedback between empirical investigation
and the normative discipline of epistemology is akin to the methodological issue around legal theory I
discussed above in “Understanding the Phenomenal World with Concepts.” Whereas legal theorists tend to
confirm the correspondence of an inchoate definition of law with some phenomena in the world, and then
close the feedback mechanism as they attempt to clarify their understanding of law based on that definition,
I argue that a more fruitful mode of procedure would be to keep the feedback mechanism open. We should
try to understand a range of related phenomena in the world, and our understanding of what phenomena we
are exploring or trying to understand should not be based simply on a definition, but rather on ongoing
feedback between what we observe in the world and our conceptual account. M Steup provides a useful and
succinct account of the terrain, (Steup, Matthias, "Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/epistemology/>). R Feldman, “Naturalized
Epistemology” is a good introduction to the ideas and controversies of naturalization in epistemology,
(Feldman, Richard, "Naturalized Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/epistemologynaturalized/>). W Quine, Ontological Relativity (1969) (supra this note), is an important early work in the
argument for naturalization in epistemology. See A Goldman, “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of
Cognition,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 10, 509 (1978) for a discussion of the uses of
cognitive psychology in a naturalized epistemology. One key idea in Quine’s version of epistemic
naturalization developed most centrally in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 60 Philosophical Review 1
(1951) 20-43, is that our knowledge is rooted in a coherent network of beliefs, both theoretical beliefs and
sense data beliefs, and none of these beliefs necessarily stand or fall on their own, though they may face
pressure that requires adjustment to the network within which they reside. This description has attracted
critiques related to the idea that all our beliefs are only grounded in other beliefs, or that there is only a
circle of belief. Kim suggests that the “supervenience of value upon fact” (400) grounds the very possibility
of normative epistemology. On the point of supervenience see Ernest Sosa, “The Foundations of
Foundationalism,” Nous, 14 (1980), 547-64, esp. at 551, and James Van Cleve, “Epistemic Supervenience
and the Circle of Belief,” The Monist 68 (1985), 90-104, esp. at 97-99. The reality of supervenience does
not completely undermine Quine’s larger project. These arguments do a good job of refuting the claim that
there exists only a circle of belief and that there are some beliefs whose existence relies on something other
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another fairly common usage of the term that is not entirely unrelated to the issues at
hand, but that sidesteps some of the technical arguments between various positions taken
by proponents of epistemological naturalization and its critics. By this common usage
“naturalization” (sometimes “naturalism”) is shorthand for the position that the sciences
and their methods represent the hallmark of epistemically serious treatment of the
phenomenal world. This soft naturalization position sidesteps the technical controversies
alluded to in the previous footnote, so much so that opponents in those arguments are
unlikely to take issue with this soft position. Leiter says of this version of naturalization
that it
… means taking seriously the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of
the practical and, then, theoretical triumph of the sciences as our most reliable
guide to what we can know and what there is. As Quine famously put it, “science
is self-conscious common sense,”60 which is to say that the epistemic standards of
the sciences are merely formal extensions of the standards of evidence and
justification that all of us employ all the time: we are all practical naturalists, and
the only question is whether we are prepared to follow out the import of the
epistemic norms that make human life possible. … the methodological
commitment at the core of naturalism … [is] to defer to whatever ontology and
epistemology falls out of successful scientific practice.61

than merely other beliefs – typically sense data, unlike the paradigmatic foundationalist theory in which the
foundational belief is bare self-awareness in the form of the cogito. Suggesting that this functions as a
refutation of Quine’s general argument does not fly. Van Cleve suggests in the same essay that Quine
himself points to the inputs of sense data as foundational (94), which he does. More importantly, Quine’s
argument about the way in which both theoretical and sense data beliefs are woven together in a web,
especially as that argument is laid out in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” (supra) functions at a higher level
of complexity than the positions easily refuted by the supervenience argument set forth in Sosa and Van
Cleve. Quine’s argument both informs and is further developed by Thomas Kuhn’s description of the
development of the scientific project as set out in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, U of Chicago
(1962). The complex theoretical descriptions of the world set forth in scientific theory do not simply bang
up against single pieces of sense data and meet their downfall. Indeed, theoretical beliefs have important
impacts on what sense data experience are available – there is a theory-ladenness of perception – one of
many important points about the psychological realities of human knowers that impact the shape of
epistemology. Chris Swoyer offers a useful introduction to the topic in his, “Relativism and the
Constructive Aspects of Perception,” (at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/supplement1.html)
which is a supplement to his “Relativism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Swoyer,
Chris, "Relativism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
(ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/relativism/>.) What’s more, the sort of
coherentist conception of beliefs that Quine argues for is not contradicted by foundationalism, or as Sosa
would argue, at least not by “formal foundationalism (549).” Supervenience is just simply the idea that
evaluative properties supervene on non-evaluative properties; if an apple is a good apple (evaluative) it is
so because it possesses certain non-evaluative properties, it is “sweet, juicy, large, etc., (551)” to use Sosa’s
example. Now, whether the suggestion that supervenience supports the possibility of foundations theory –
and also undermines naturalization – depends on what we mean, at least, by naturalization. Quite simply,
the reality of supervenience tends to cut both ways. It suggests that some form of foundationalism is
possible, but at the same time undermines claims of a radical fact-value distinction such as Hume seemed
to maintain. I will revisit supervenience below.
60
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This quote comes from the introduction to a book which is a collection of essays that
connects American legal realists with this sort of naturalization project. In a later essay he
writes:
The Legal Realists thought that the task of legal theory was to identify and
describe – not justify – the patterns of court decisions; the social sciences – or at
least social-scientific-type inquiries – were to be the tool for carrying out this nonnormative task. There is a sense, then, in which we may think of the jurisprudence
of adjudication the Realists advocated as a naturalized jurisprudence on the model
of something like Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Just as a naturalized
epistemology – in Quine’s famous formulation – “simply falls into place as a
chapter of psychology”62 as “a purely descriptive, causal-nomological science of
human cognition,”63 so too a naturalized jurisprudence for the Realists is an
essentially descriptive theory of the causal connections between underlying
situation-types and actual decisions.64
Leiter goes on to argue that the reason for naturalization in each instance is a recognition
of the failure of the normative project. Thus, “the Realists can be read as advocating an
empirical theory of adjudication precisely because they think the traditional
jurisprudential project of trying to show decisions to be justified on the basis of legal
rules and reasons is a failure.”65 This is the fairly standard point about the realists that
they understood law generally to be indeterminate and best understood by looking
beyond the law itself.66 When this work is focused on judicial decision-making the
realists are frequently described as taking the position that the law is whatever the judge
says it is on decision day. The reality that court decisions may not be determined by a
combination of the law and the facts of the case, but rather by other matters, is indeed
realistic, and it seems difficult to imagine a legal world in which such frank assessment of
the existence of “external” inputs into judicial decision-making and the “law” was not
present. A frequent criticism levelled at American legal realism as a contribution to
general jurisprudence is the claim that the views articulated are fundamentally about
prediction of court behaviours and not describing what the law is more generally. But this
criticism is lumping a very diverse body of research together – some of which is indeed
focused on predicting judicial decision making with a particular focus on extra-legal
inputs – but other work which ventures far beyond this limited project. 67
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11. Empirical Legal Theory
Now, as I have already pointed out, Twining argues, and I agree, that the tendency to
reduce all of ALR to a predictive theory of adjudication is a misconstrual of the broader
project of ALR. Leiter is not alone in construing ALR this way. But the broader project
of ALR fits in nicely with what I, following Cotterrell, am here calling empirical legal
theory. ELT takes a scientific approach to understanding a feature common to virtually
all societies: institutionalized obligatory norm enforcement that claims pre-eminence, or,
law. That is, ELT takes a structural functional approach to understanding and exploring
these phenomena.
Leiter, in “Demarcation Problem” advocates a new sceptical approach, that is, giving up
on the project of defining the essence of law. Above I suggested that we need to
distinguish between definition as the goal of a project, or determining the essence of law,
and heuristic definitions that are required to be able to think about and focus on an object
of investigation. I would expand on my just proffered seven word description of law, that
is, “institutionalized obligatory norm enforcement that claims pre-eminence” in the
following way: Human groupings (societies) have conventional norms and institutions
that claim authority over the group; usually the most powerful and effective of these is
recognizable both to those exercising the power and those subject to it (there may be
overlap in these groups); such power is generally recognized with an honorific: “law” is
the word in English. Yet, both the application of the honorific, and the exercise of power
through norms and institutions, are always a matter of contention. Understanding legal
phenomena involves understanding that terrain of contention.
Or, consider another heuristic description of a functional understanding of law, offered by
Twining as a description of Llewellyn’s position: “The law-jobs theory was a central
element of Llewellyn’s legal thought. It is grounded in the proposition that human groups
have certain needs that must be met for the group to survive or pursue common goals.
These needs are a source of actual or potential conflict. As conflict poses a threat to
group survival, the prevention and resolution of conflict are essential for group survival
and effectiveness.”68 Law-jobs offers a functional description of the things that law does
and is used as an anthropological description for identifying the legal institutions and
legal norms of social groups that do not correspond to modern Western states. E.
Adamson Hoebel offers another possibility. He writes, “… for working purposes law may
be defined in these terms: A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly
met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual or group
possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting.”69 Or, consider Malinowski’s
very concise description: “Law is the specific result of the configuration of obligations,
which makes it impossible for the native to shirk his responsibility without suffering for it
in the future.”70
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All of the foregoing “definitions” of law are structural, functional and heuristic. I put
definition in scare quotes because of the heuristic or provisional nature of the descriptions
of law that social scientists employ when they are deciding whether to classify various
phenomena as “legal”; these are thinkers who are generally sceptical of the idea of law
having an essence. Scepticism about defining the essential properties of law long predates
Leiter. This basic sort of description was operative in the debate about the amenability of
law to scientific investigation that I presented above. As Roger Cotterrell puts it: “There
is … a fundamental difference between a definition of law, which legislates the way we
are to think of it and, in effect, terminates inquiry, and a model of law which is no more
than a starting point for study, a peg on which to hang ideas, data and hypotheses. Openminded inquiry requires merely provisional concepts.”71
12. Internal and External Points of View
One useful way to understand differences between ELT and legal positivism is between
the emphasis on internal or external points of view (POVs). Herbert Hart, of course,
emphasized the internal POV as the perspective that offered insight and understanding of
the law. By his description the appropriate way to try to understand the law was to
assume the internal POV, that is, the position of people who operate within the system,
and in important respects, who make the system. Think of oneself as a lawyer or judge,
and assume the perspective of belonging to, and sympathizing with, the institutions that
this entails.
This contrasts neatly with the idea expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes that the best way
to understand the law is to assume the perspective of the “bad man”72 and to bathe one’s
perspective in “cynical acid.”73 When trying to understand the law the bad man asks no
questions about what the right thing to do is, but merely what are the risks of legal
sanction that he faces in trying to pursue his desired actions. Whether one counts Holmes
as an early realist, or not, it is a perspective that strongly informs the realist project.
It is important to note, that there is no inherent connection between ontological claims
about law and commitments to points of view. As I have already noted, points of view as
I am describing them here, are epistemic heuristics. Anthropologists distinguish between
internal and external points of view, or etics (external POV) and emics (internal POV), to
use their technical vocabulary. If I can usefully try to understand the legal systems of
existing states by assuming the internal pov, I can equally use this epistemic heuristic to
understand law as described by ELT. There are many possible examples. Take one
prominent example, the legal institutions described by Boaventura de Sousa Santos in a
judge, and the like), by which a dispute is solved, or a party is advised before any legally relevant behavior
takes place, or by which approval is given to a previous solution of a dispute made by the participants
before the dispute was brought to the attention of the authority. … A decision serves not only to resolve a
dispute … but it also represents a precedent … Thus the field of law consists of principles abstracted from
the decisions of authorities (37).”
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Brazilian favela to fill various legal jobs in the vacuum left by the official institutions of
the state, not exclusively, but most especially the law of land titles.74 It matters not one
iota that ELTs see in this example phenomena that have the hallmarks of law and
positivists do not, I can still assume the internal POV in relationship to these phenomena
and usefully learn important things about the phenomena from doing so.
13. Positive Law and Normativity
But one important difference between the different POVs is the take they are likely to
produce on the normativity of law. Is law inherently normative, does it tell us what we
ought to do? It seems almost silly to ask the question, but it is worth querying a little
closer, especially given the way in which the idea of law’s normativity is used by Raz
(and Leiter) to reinforce the idea that law is a hermeneutic concept, only knowable from
the internal point of view, and enjoying a special epistemic status.
The social and separation theses assert that positive law is a social product, valid based
on its sources, and not on its moral worth. Austinian positivism dismisses the normativity
of law by describing law as the commands of the sovereign.75 But Hart and Raz are both
interested in describing law as normative, even as they assert that it is a factually existing
social phenomenon and morally inert. What are we to make of the puzzle of a morally
inert normative system? In important respects the puzzle dissolves if we are both
epistemically serious about the object in question, and give careful consideration to the
structure of normativity. Now, of course, I will not resolve disputes about normativity
and its reducibility here, but I will try to marshal evidence sufficient to call into question
the strongest forms of the fact-value distinction, and as a consequence, call into question
the way it is used to suggest that law is an epistemically special object. Here are three
reasons to doubt the strong version of the fact-value distinction and the special epistemic
status of normative systems.
Normative statements as conditionals/imperatives, strong fact-value distinction and freefloating goals
First, it is important to think about the fact-value distinction. In its strong form it suggests
that there is an absolute distinction between facts and values; values are not reducible to
facts, but are, rather, primitive or elemental. It is at least intuitively plausible that claims
or statements about what ought to be done are members of a different class or category
from statements about what is in fact the case. We can think of normative claims as
structured as conditionals, or hypothetical imperatives, which only tell me what I should
do given some other goal; it defines a means to an end. If I want to quench my thirst I
should drink. “You shouldn’t steal” can be rephrased as “if you want to be a good person
(obey the law/avoid criminal sanction), you shouldn’t steal.” Now we might question the
“normativity” of hypothetical conditionals on a couple of grounds. First, a merely
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hypothetical conditional, especially one that turns out to be counter-factual might really
not be normative at all. For instance, “You should take the M3 to get to London from
Southampton” doesn’t seem to tell me what I “ought” to do, if I don’t in fact want to go
to London. Second, some uses of normative language are false friends, as language
teachers sometimes say. For instance, “You should give me $5,” sounds normative but
frequently means the same as, “Give me $5,” – it is an order or request. Perhaps then the
truly normative, so this argument might go, are those things for which there is some
objective value to the first part of the conditional. For instance, in epistemic norms: “if
you want to have justified true beliefs (or, knowledge), then you should follow reliable
procedures to produce them.” It might be possible to imagine a case in which a person
does not want to know something, but producing knowledge is the epistemic project, and
discussing its norms is not hypothetical, it is categorical. For epistemic purposes you
should (categorically) follow procedures that produce true beliefs. But if the goal is some
objective good then surely the differences about how to achieve the good are contingent
factual questions about what methods are best, just as the question of the fastest way to
London is. Now any imperative, even categorical imperatives, can be rephrased as
conditionals, though in the case of the latter the good to be achieved will be seen as both
objective and overriding.76
Now, the most radical form of fact-value distinction is driven by Humean scepticism and
its ilk. Hume understands the conditional structure of normative or value claims and
conceives of the goal side of the conditional as structured by desire, which he conceives
of as floating freely from reason. He writes, “’tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”77 No need here to consider
Hume’s emotivist ethics. Hume is suggesting that there is an unbridgeable chasm
between the goals my desire sets and the reasoning I can call on as a tool to achieve those
goals, but that “reason” is purely a slave to passion. For Hume then, goals, driven by
emotions, are free-floating, (perhaps volitional), but unconstrained by reason. And, it is
the nature of free-floating a-reasonable goals that drive the strong fact-value distinction
for Hume. However, this sort of scepticism driving a strong fact-value distinction seems
most relevant to the sorts of goals we are here least interested in – my itches and desires
to go to London. There are, nonetheless, lots of other normative goals, like knowledge,
where there is nothing free-floating at all about the goals. The goal is what the project is
about, and if I am not trying to discover the means to the goal, then I am simply not
engaged in the project. Now, if the goal is fixed, then while there might be arguments
about the contingent facts of how to best achieve the goal, the dispute is, nonetheless
about facts.
Points of view
Second, as already suggested, different epistemically heuristic POVs can have an
important impact on whether one describes law as normative. One way to understand
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Raz’s account of law as a hermeneutic concept knowable only from the internal point of
view is to think of this as a way of trying to understand law as essentially normative and
the internal POV as offering unique access to normative knowledge. But Raz’s idea of
how to know about the normativity of law and the idea of normativity itself merit closer
examination here.
While Raz and Hart suggest that the internal POV is the position we need to assume to
understand the normativity of law, it is equally possible to turn to the external POV. It is
possible to observe the society of others with an eye to discerning the structure of social
relations that guide the members of the society. And, viewing a society we are likely to
discern that the people of this society make judgments about what both is and is not
acceptable behaviour. Furthermore, even for societies with which we find ourselves in
radical disagreement about their judgments on these matters we are nonetheless likely to
be able to discern through ongoing observation the pattern of these judgments. To further
our understanding, and to test our knowledge, we are likely to do a couple of things. First,
we are likely to move from noting individual observations about what we believe these
judgments to be, to trying to discern the internal logic of these judgments. (This really is
a big step. The internal logic of these judgments of a very different society is likely to use
different categories of understanding than we use.) Second, after we have modelled for
ourselves the internal logic of this society’s judgments we are likely to want to test our
model by proposing hypotheses about what judgments of as yet unseen behaviour
patterns are likely to be.
Now, if someone puts the question to us as to whether the judgments of these people are
normative, the answer must begin, “It depends on your perspective.” Clearly, for the
people of the observed society the judgments (and the “system” of which they are a part)
are normative. It tells them what they ought and ought not do. But while we as observers
understand that it is normative for them, it is nonetheless not normative for us, ie, it does
not tell us how to behave. But, if we go from observers of, to participants in the society
we had been observing, what then are these norms to us? Unless the members of the
society are going to grant us special status (and let’s assume that they won’t) then we can
either comply with the requirements or face its consequences. But even if we decide to
comply we can take different perspectives on what we are doing by complying. We can
adjust ourselves so as to try to assume the beliefs of the people we are living with, or we
can take our “scientific” knowledge and use it heuristically to avoid trouble (or we might
find ourselves somewhere between these two options.)78
Supervenience
Third, as I have already noted above (in the long footnote about naturalization) evaluative
properties supervene on non-evaluative properties; if an apple is a good apple
(evaluative) it is so because it possesses certain non-evaluative properties, it is “sweet,
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juicy, large, etc.,”79 to use Sosa’s example. And such evaluations are objective. Consider
Hare’s example:
Suppose we say ‘St. Francis was a good man’. It is logically impossible to say this
and to maintain at the same time that there might have been another man placed
exactly in the same circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in exactly the
same way, but who differed from St. Francis in this respect only, that he was not a
good man.80
Now, the suggestion I am trying to counter is that law has a special epistemic status
because it is a normative system. But normativity and evaluations generally follow upon
natural properties. Of course it still might be the case that knowing what makes apples
and saints good is different than being able to observe those facts in the world. But
according to the positivist description of law, law is a normative order, morally inert and
wholly constituted by a set of political institutions. In order for a lawyer to know what
laws are applicable in a situation she does not engage in a special epistemic project of
determining what the categorical imperative requires, but rather she consults the real
world sources of law – the constitution, statutes, and case law. Discerning what legal
norms are, whether in a modern legal state, or in a “primitive” society, does not in fact
require special kinds of knowledge related to normativity, but only the ability to read
legal sources, or discern regularized patterns of social behaviour.
14. Kinds of things
In an essay entitled “Natural Kinds”81 Quine puzzles over the idea of similarity, over the
idea that two things are of a kind. Grouping things into kinds, things that are similar, is a
fundamental aspect of how we understand the world and get around in it. And yet, the
idea of similarity, of kind, Quine suggests, has a difficult relationship with either the
ideas of logic or set theory. As animals in the world we would be utterly stymied without
the capacity to distinguish like from unlike, to distinguish bear-like things from motherlike things. That we have an innate sense of kind is necessary for us to even acquire
language. And, importantly for getting around in the world it gives us the capacity to
make predictions about things. By understanding similarity we understand that constant
conjunctions are causal, that similar series of events repeat themselves. The world we
inhabit has a deep structure that produces certain kinds of predictable regularity. It is hard
to imagine how it could be otherwise, but that it is, is quite fortuitous for us – it underpins
the very possibility of knowledge.
Why does our innate subjective spacing of qualities accord so well with the
functionally relevant groupings in nature as to make our inductions tend to come
out right? Why should our subjective spacing of qualities have a special purchase
on nature and a lien on the future? There is some encouragement in Darwin. If
people’s innate spacing of qualities is a gene-linked trait, then the spacing that has
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made for the most successful inductions will have tended to predominate through
natural selection. Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic
but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.82
But if our sense of similarity and dissimilarity, of kinds, is essential for language learning
and getting around in the world, if our innate subjective spacing does a good job on some
level, then it is also limited in other ways. Colour seems very important to us as we work
our way around in the world in a quotidian way, food gathering, for instance, but, Quine
suggests, it is rather secondary (and at times a hindrance) for the scientist. But we also
have the ingenuity to rise above our innate quality space. The scientist develops modified
similarity standards for scientific purposes. We stop thinking of whales and porpoises as
fishes. But,
[a] theoretical kind need not be a modification of an intuitive one. It may issue
from theory full-blown, without antecedents; for instance the kind which
comprises positively charged particles.83
What we hope and strive for in developing our sense of similarity is a better
understanding of reality. “Things are similar in the later or theoretical sense to the degree
that they are interchangeable parts of the cosmic machine revealed by science.”84
Ultimately both similarity and subjunctive conditionals such as “If this were in water it
would dissolve” themselves dissolve in sciences that reach a certain maturity. In
chemistry the dispositional account of solubility is replaced by a structural description of
the mechanism.85 The idea of a natural kind object, an object that intuitively seems to be
a member of a class of objects in the natural world, then, is ultimately replaced by a
theoretical type of object, an object that is a member of a class of objects in virtue not of
an innate sense, but of a worked out and finer grain scientific (or epistemically serious)
description of the world. It is my view that there is a range of phenomena common to
human societies that can be roughly described as institutional obligatory norm
enforcement that claims pre-eminence, or law, and that it makes sense, when being
epistemically serious about the phenomenal world, to think of and investigate this range
of phenomena as members of a class of related phenomena.
15. Conclusion
There is a fairly long running, if somewhat obscured, argument between ELTs and
positivists about how to understand and describe law. In his recent “Demarcation
Problem” Brian Leiter has raised good reasons to be sceptical of the question about law’s
“nature.” However, ELTs have been consistently sceptical about this question and have
instead always employed merely heuristic “definitions” of law that allow them to
approach the “law” like other social phenomena that are normal epistemic objects.
Positivists generally argue, as against natural law theorists, that the object they are
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interested in, actually existing positive law, is a social fact and its normative claims (its
claims to tell us what we ought to do) are clearly distinguishable from the normative
claims of morality; positivists frequently seem to be claiming that they are engaged in an
analysis of objectively observable reality and the consequences that flow from those
observations and descriptions. I have argued that positivism is generally more driven by a
commitment to a specific ontology, a specific definition of “law”, than it is by epistemic
goals of understanding the world. The positivist account relies on understanding “law” as
having a special epistemic status. I have argued, that for several reasons, it makes more
sense to think of law as a naturally occurring, though humanly created, social
phenomenon, somewhat akin to natural languages, and that as such, it is a normal (nonspecial) epistemic object.

